Title and Abstract

A Phenomenological Description of the Self

William Paul Meacham, B.A., M.A,

Dissertation

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of The University of Texas at Austin in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

The University of Texas at Austin

December, 1971

Acknowledgements

Thanks are due the following people for their contributions to this dissertation: Dr. Laszlo Versenyi, for inspiring in me the Socratic spirit of Philosophy, and Dr. Richard Zaner, for immeasurably enhancing my understanding of Husserl and Phenomenology.

Abstract

This paper outlines the results of a phenomenological investigation into the nature of the self. It is a conceptual model of the composition and functional structure which is, I hope, true for all human selves.

Phenomenology is biasless reflective examination of experience, in this case experience of the self. Thus, the model of the self presented is a model of the self as experienced by itself. To do phenomenology, each person must examine his or her own experience. Thus, this essay is devoted to outlining the results of my own examination of my experience of myself. By reporting these results in a language publicly available to all, I make it possible for others to compare the findings of their own reflective examination of themselves with my results, thereby making possible consensual validation or disconfirmation of assertions regarding the nature of the self.

The investigation proceeds from the transcendental Self (what Husserl calls the transcendental Ego) taken as that-which-is-conscious to the empirical self, that synthetic unity of diverse elements available as objects of consciousness which each of us is, to the transcendental Self taken as agent, as that-which-acts. The transcendental Self is inherently incapable of becoming an object of consciousness, for it is that which is itself conscious. Strictly speaking we should not use a noun phrase, but should rather speak of experiencing and acting as functions of the self to which no particular experiencable objects or types of objects correspond.

The empirical self is the self as available in experience to conscious examination; it is that complex of affairs of which I am or can become conscious which has or can rationally acquire the sense “me” or “mine.” It is composed of thinking and thoughts, perceptions, bodily sensations, emotions, moods, the self-concept, and deliberate and habitual action viewed from the point of view of that person whose action it is.

Though composed of many elements, the self is a unity in that it is located in a single place, is embodied, and its elements are functionally related to each other and to the whole in a teleological drive toward survival, health and happiness.

The self is intrinsically related to its world, to other selves, and to itself. By virtue of its relation to itself, the self is free to choose courses of action and to perform them. It is free to determine for itself ethical maxims by which to guide its actions fruitfully. Determination of such ethical maxims is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.